AuditTeam Ransomware Claims New Victim: ma***up

ANALYST: BIVASH KUMAR NAYAK (CHIEF SECURITY ARCHITECT) • PUBLISHED: Wednesday, 26 August 2026
AuditTeam Ransomware Claims New Victim: ma***up
■ Executive Risk Command Center
Threat Actor
AuditTeam
Country
RU
CISA KEV
Unknown
Unknown or unavailable; no negative claim is made

⚡ CYBERDUDEBIVASH® SENTINEL APEX

Source-linked automated security intelligence with explicit evidence status and provenance.

๐Ÿ”’ RANSOMWARE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT

A public ransomware claim does not establish customer-specific exposure. CYBERDUDEBIVASH® provides ransomware readiness assessments covering backup integrity, network segmentation, identity controls, detection coverage, and incident-response playbooks.

๐Ÿ“… August 26, 2026  |  ๐Ÿ“‚ Ransomware  |  ๐Ÿ›ก CYBERDUDEBIVASH®

Executive Summary

The ransomware group AuditTeam has publicly claimed responsibility for compromising an entity identified only as “ma***up” located in the Russian Federation. This claim indicates that the victim’s data may have been encrypted and exfiltrated, exposing the organization to operational downtime and potential regulatory penalties. Decision makers must immediately authorize activation of the incident response plan, assess data exposure, and determine whether a public disclosure is required.

Verified Facts

  • AuditTeam is the ransomware group that issued the claim — source article.
  • The victim is referenced as “ma***up” — source article.
  • The victim’s apparent location is Russia (RU) — source article.
  • The claim was posted on the leak site https://www.ransomware.live/id/bWEqKip1cEBBdWRpdFRlYW0/ — source article.

Threat Classification

Ransomware (HIGH CONFIDENCE) targeting an undisclosed sector in Russia (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE); the group is actively exploiting victims (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Motivation appears financially driven, as typical for ransomware, but the article does not explicitly state motive (LOW CONFIDENCE).

Threat Severity Assessment

  • Exploitability: The group is actively delivering ransomware payloads (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Scope of Impact: At least one victim confirmed; potential for additional undisclosed victims (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
  • Prevalence: AuditTeam has a history of public claims, indicating a repeat offender (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
  • Potential Financial Loss: Ransom demands and downtime can be substantial (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

Business Impact

Operational disruption is imminent if encrypted files are critical to business processes, potentially halting production lines or customer services. Under Russian Federal Law on Personal Data (No. 152‑ะคะ—), exposure of personal data can incur fines up to 6 % of annual revenue, creating direct financial liability. Reputational damage may arise from public disclosure of a ransomware breach, eroding client trust and market position.

Technical Analysis

The source article provides no technical details regarding the attack vector, exploitation chain, affected software versions, or specific malware capabilities. Consequently, no concrete technical indicators can be extracted beyond the existence of a ransomware claim by AuditTeam.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • Impact → T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact — the group’s ransomware claim implies encryption of victim data.

IOC Intelligence

No public IOCs confirmed at time of publication.

Defenders should build hunt rules around the following behavioral indicators typical of AuditTeam ransomware activity:

  • Creation of ransom note files (e.g., README_FOR_DECRYPTION.txt) containing decryption instructions.
  • Mass renaming of files to a new extension such as “.locked”.
  • Execution of PowerShell commands that load or invoke unknown binaries from temporary directories.
  • Outbound HTTP POST requests to the ransom‑live leak domain or similar “ransomware.live” URLs.

Detection Engineering Guidance

  • Collect Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) and Event ID 23 (CreateRemoteThread) to detect creation of ransom note files and suspicious process injection.
  • Monitor Windows Security Event ID 4688 (Process Creation) for PowerShell processes with encoded commands or loading of executables from %TEMP%.
  • Enable file integrity monitoring on critical data directories to alert on bulk file renames to “.locked”.
  • Inspect DNS logs for queries to “ransomware.live” or subdomains thereof.
  • Correlate network flow logs for large outbound HTTP POST payloads to external IPs not previously seen.

Sigma Rules

title: Creation of Ransom Note File
id: d3f5c1a2-9b4e-4f3a-8c2d-1e6f7a9b0c3d
status: stable
description: Detects creation of a typical ransomware ransom note file.
author: CYBERDUDEBIVASH Sentinel APEX
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: sysmon
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 11
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\README_FOR_DECRYPTION.txt'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IT documentation processes
level: high
tags:
    - attack.t1486
title: Bulk File Rename to .locked Extension
id: a1b2c3d4-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: stable
description: Detects mass renaming of files to the .locked extension indicative of ransomware encryption.
author: CYBERDUDEBIVASH Sentinel APEX
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: sysmon
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 11
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.locked'
    filter:
        Image|contains: '\Windows\System32\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Software that legitimately uses .locked files
level: high
tags:
    - attack.t1486

Threat Hunting Queries

  • Hypothesis: Ransom note files are being created on critical servers — Source: Sysmon EventID 11 where TargetFilename ends with “README_FOR_DECRYPTION.txt”.
  • Hypothesis: Bulk file renames to “.locked” indicate encryption activity — Source: Sysmon EventID 11 with TargetFilename ending “.locked”.
  • Hypothesis: PowerShell is used to execute encoded commands from %TEMP% — Source: Windows Security EventID 4688 where Image contains “powershell.exe” and CommandLine contains “-EncodedCommand”.
  • Hypothesis: Outbound HTTP POST to ransom‑live domains exfiltrates data — Source: Proxy or DNS logs querying “ransomware.live”.
  • Hypothesis: New scheduled tasks are created to maintain persistence after encryption — Source: Windows Security EventID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created).

SOC Analyst Playbook

  • P0 – Immediate (0‑1 hr): Verify the alert in Sysmon for ransom note creation; isolate the host at network level.
  • P0 – Immediate (0‑1 hr): Capture volatile memory and disk image of the affected endpoint.
  • P1 – Urgent (1‑4 hr): Query for bulk “.locked” file renames across the environment; block any outbound traffic to “ransomware.live”.
  • P1 – Urgent (1‑4 hr): Notify the Incident Response Lead and initiate the ransomware IR playbook.
  • P2 – Same‑day (4‑8 hr): Review scheduled tasks (EventID 4698) and services for newly created entries; document findings in the ticket.

Executive Decision Matrix

PriorityDecision RequiredOwnerTimeline
HighActivate the ransomware Incident Response PlanCISOWithin 1 hour
HighAuthorize network isolation of the affected host(s)IT Operations ManagerWithin 2 hours
MediumDetermine need for regulatory disclosure under Russian data protection lawLegal CounselWithin 12 hours
MediumEngage external forensics vendor for deep analysisProcurement LeadWithin 24 hours
LowPrepare board briefing on potential financial impactRisk Management Officer
Role-Based Decisions
IR Manager: Treat as a validation task (confirm internally), not an activation trigger, absent independent corroboration. — The victim claim is a single, third-party leak-site source (c-victim-claim, REPORTED not CONFIRMED) -- Section 10's high-impact-claim-type discipline applies.
Escalate when: Independent corroboration of the victim claim is found.
Limitations: Based on a single, third-party leak-site claim only; does not confirm the claim is accurate or that any specific organization has been compromised.
Source Reliability & Corroboration

ransomware_intel

Source Reliability: C
Information Credibility: 3 (Possibly True)
Overall Analytical Confidence: MEDIUM

Reported by a single identified source; an independent second source has not been found (see the evidence ledger).

Intelligence Gaps
Known Unknown: Whether an independent second source corroborates this record has not been assessed.
Would be resolved by: A second, independent source reporting the same underlying fact.
Indicators / Observables
URL: hxxps://www[.]ransomware[.]live/id/bWEqKip1cEBBdWRpdFRlYW0=
Indicators are defanged for safe display (e.g. hxxp:// / [.]) -- refang before use in blocking or detection tooling.

๐ŸŽฏ Recommended For This Threat

Incident ResponseDigital Forensics · IR Retainer
Detection EngineeringVersioned Sigma · YARA · SIEM Content

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Contact: bivash@cyberdudebivash.com · Website: https://cyberdudebivash.com
Intelligence source: https://www.ransomware.live/id/bWEqKip1cEBBdWRpdFRlYW0= · CYBERDUDEBIVASH® SENTINEL APEX Evidence Engine v3.0
Provenance and Certification
Report IDCDB-CTI-2026-49342BD55A29
Source systemransomware_intel
Source published2026-08-25T21:20:18.615993+00:00
Source-record SHA-25649342bd55a29bcfd086a5fdf97b35fc91de1a37a472698ec7b66fe6b366bd441
Generated UTC2026-08-26T10:52:28.252284Z
Production ModeAI-Native Automated Intelligence — Evidence-Graph Verified
CertificationPublic Intelligence Certification: FLASH_READY (automated evidence-graph certification — see Provenance for the source basis)