CVE-2026-80104 — CVSS 9.8 CRITICAL Severity | NVD Vulnerability Record

ANALYST: BIVASH KUMAR NAYAK (CHIEF SECURITY ARCHITECT) • PUBLISHED: Wednesday, 26 August 2026
CVE-2026-80104 — CVSS 9.8 CRITICAL Severity | NVD Vulnerability Record
■ Executive Risk Command Center
CVE ID
CVE-2026-80104
CVSS Score
9.8
CRITICAL
CISA KEV
Not Listed
Not present in the verified catalog snapshot; this does not prove absence of exploitation
Urgent exposure review? — YES — CVSS ≥ 9.0 (Critical)

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🔍 CVE-2026-80104  |  ⚠ CVSS 9.8  |  📅 August 25, 2026  |  📂 Vulnerabilities  |  🛡 CYBERDUDEBIVASH®

Executive Summary

The DB‑GPT API endpoint /skill_upload allows unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary files to any writable path on the server, enabling remote code execution. Organizations running DB‑GPT face immediate risk of full system compromise, data exfiltration, and regulatory breach. Decision makers must authorize immediate mitigation (disable the endpoint or apply input validation) and initiate incident response within the next hour.

Verified Facts

  • DB‑GPT builds the destination path for an uploaded skill from the multipart filename without constraining it to the upload directory — article.
  • The skill_upload function writes the request body to upload_dir / filename, allowing absolute or traversal paths to resolve outside the intended directory — article.
  • No canonicalisation, root‑path check, or .py suffix block is performed on the constructed path — article.
  • The endpoint’s only dependency, get_user_from_headers, returns an admin role regardless of the presence of a user_id header, making the route reachable without credentials — article.
  • A remote attacker can place a malicious Python module in the application package and achieve code execution when the module is imported — article.

Threat Classification

Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via insecure file upload (CWE‑22) targeting DB‑GPT deployments (AI/LLM platforms) worldwide; exploitation is currently theoretical but fully feasible given the lack of authentication and path sanitisation (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Motivations are likely to obtain system control for data theft or further lateral movement (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

Threat Severity Assessment

  • CVSS 9.8 (Critical) – confidence HIGH.
  • Remote network‑only exploitation without authentication – confidence HIGH.
  • Full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact (code execution, data breach, service disruption) – confidence HIGH.
  • Broad applicability to any environment running the vulnerable DB‑GPT version – confidence MEDIUM.

Business Impact

Successful exploitation permits an attacker to implant malicious Python modules, leading to credential theft, ransomware deployment, or sabotage of AI services, causing operational downtime and loss of AI‑driven revenue. If personal data is accessed, GDPR fines can reach €20 million or 4 % of annual turnover, and NIS2/DORA penalties may apply for failure to protect critical digital services. Reputational damage includes loss of client trust in AI offerings and potential contract termination.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in skill_upload (packages/dbgpt‑app/src/dbgpt_app/openapi/api_v1/agentic_data_api.py) which writes the uploaded file to upload_dir / filename. Path concatenation discards the left operand when the supplied filename is absolute (e.g., /tmp/x) or contains parent‑directory references (e.g., ../../../tmp/x), allowing directory traversal. No canonicalisation or suffix filtering is performed, so a .py file can be placed inside the application package. Authentication is bypassed because get_user_from_headers (dbgpt_serve/utils/auth.py) always returns an admin role, making the endpoint publicly accessible. An attacker can therefore write arbitrary bytes to any writable location and achieve code execution when the malicious module is imported by the server process. CWE‑22 (Path Traversal) is the root cause; CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

CVE Analysis

  • CVE‑2026‑80104 – DB‑GPT (all versions) – CWE‑22 – Network‑only, No Authentication required – No patch disclosed at time of publication.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • Initial Access → T1190: Exploit Public‑Facing Application — the unauthenticated file‑upload endpoint is directly exploitable.
  • Execution → T1059.007: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python — malicious .py module is executed by the Python runtime.
  • Impact → T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact (potential ransomware after code execution) — inferred from the ability to run arbitrary code.

IOC Intelligence

No public IOCs confirmed at time of publication.

Defenders should create hunt rules for the following behavioral indicators:

  • HTTP POST requests to /skill_upload containing a filename with “../” or a leading “/”.
  • Creation of new *.py files in the DB‑GPT installation directory outside the designated upload folder.
  • Unexpected import or loading of a newly added Python module by the DB‑GPT process (e.g., sys.modules entry).
  • Immediate launch of a Python interpreter (process name python.exe or python3) by the web‑application user after a file upload.

Detection Engineering Guidance

Collect and correlate the following logs:

  • Web server access logs (e.g., Nginx access.log) – filter for POST /skill_upload with suspicious filename patterns.
  • Application logs – monitor for file‑write errors or warnings in skill_upload module.
  • OS audit logs (Linux auditd) – watch for open or creat syscalls targeting paths ending in *.py outside the upload directory.
  • Process creation logs (Sysmon Event ID 1) – detect python.exe processes spawned by the DB‑GPT service account within seconds of a file upload.

Correlate the timestamp of the upload request with subsequent file creation and process launch events to generate a high‑confidence alert.

Sigma Rules

title: Suspicious DB-GPT Skill Upload Path Traversal
id: 3f9c2a1e-5b4d-4f9a-8c2e-1a7d9e6b4f12
status: stable
description: Detects HTTP POST to /skill_upload with a filename containing directory traversal or absolute path, indicating exploitation of CVE-2026-80104.
author: CYBERDUDEBIVASH Sentinel Apex
logsource:
    product: nginx
    service: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        http_method: POST
        uri: /skill_upload
        request_body|contains:
            - '../'
            - '/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Internal testing of file upload functionality
level: high
tags:
    - attack.t1190
title: Creation of Unauthorized Python Module in DB-GPT Directory
id: d2a7c9f4-6e3b-4a1d-9f5b-2c8e7d1a3b6e
status: stable
description: Detects creation of .py files in the DB-GPT installation path outside the designated upload folder, a hallmark of CVE-2026-80104 exploitation.
author: CYBERDUDEBIVASH Sentinel Apex
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        syscall: openat
        exe: /usr/bin/python3
        a0|endswith: ".py"
        a1|contains: "O_CREAT"
        a2|contains: "/opt/dbgpt"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate deployment of new Python modules by developers
level: high
tags:
    - attack.t1059.007

Threat Hunting Queries

  • Hypothesis: Attackers upload files with traversal sequences – query Nginx access logs for POST /skill_upload where request_body contains “../” or starts with “/”.
  • Hypothesis: Malicious Python modules are written to the DB‑GPT codebase – query Linux audit logs for openat syscalls creating *.py files under /opt/dbgpt/* outside the upload folder.
  • Hypothesis: New Python modules are imported after upload – query Sysmon Event ID 1 for python.exe processes with command line arguments pointing to newly created .py files in the DB‑GPT directory.
  • Hypothesis: Unauthorized admin actions follow file upload – query application logs for successful admin role assignments immediately after a /skill_upload request.
  • Hypothesis: Unexpected outbound connections from the DB‑GPT service after code execution – query network flow logs for connections from the DB‑GPT process to external IPs within 5 minutes of a file upload.

SOC Analyst Play

Threat Hunting — hunt-CDB-CTI-2026-034249FC19F8-exposure

Hypothesis: If CVE-2026-80104 is deployed and reachable as described by CDB-CTI-2026-034249FC19F8's evidence (CVE: CVE-2026-80104), telemetry consistent with the vulnerability class below may show attempted or successful exploitation.

Required telemetry: Collect decoded request target, destination/upstream address, response status, and application error telemetry.
Required telemetry: Treat matches as investigation leads; confirm product route and affected version before escalation.
Pivot: Pivot on the affected component's inventoried version/build identifier, where available.
Pivot: Pivot on network paths and identities with reachability to the affected component.
Expected if true: Requests, processes, or events consistent with the vulnerability class described in this report's Technical Analysis, occurring after the CVE's public disclosure date and targeting the specific affected component.
Negative indicator: No matching telemetry for the affected component across the retrospective lookback window.
Negative indicator: The affected component is confirmed not deployed, or not reachable as this CVE describes.
False-positive risk: Legitimate administrative, diagnostic, or scanning activity against the same component can resemble exploitation attempts; corroborate with authentication context and known-good change records before escalating.

Success criteria: A specific, timestamped, corroborated telemetry match consistent with the vulnerability class, tied to the confirmed affected component.

Escalation criteria: Escalate to incident response only when a validated telemetry match is corroborated by at least one additional independent signal (e.g. an authentication anomaly or unexpected process lineage) -- a single matching log line alone is not sufficient grounds for escalation.

Confidence: MEDIUM — Maturity: PROPOSED (not independently confirmed by execution against real telemetry)

Limitations: Derived from the vulnerability class alone; does not confirm the affected component is actually deployed in the reader's environment, nor that matching telemetry represents genuine exploitation rather than benign activity.

Structured ATT&CK Assessment

T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application (initial-access)

STATUS: CONDITIONAL · CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM

Initial Access → Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190), conditional on an exposed web application.

Limitation: Conditional on the deployment/exploitation scenario described in the source record; not confirmed by telemetry.

Role-Based Decisions
Vulnerability Manager: Track against cve vulnerability advisory intake. Exploitation status: Not confirmed by available evidence; not in verified KEV snapshot. Patch status: Availability not established in the source record — verify vendor guidance. — Prioritization reflects this record's own exploitation/patch evidence, not a fixed severity template.
Limitations: Reflects only this record's own reported exploitation and patch status; does not confirm whether the affected component is deployed in any specific environment.
SOC Manager: Review the detection guidance below before enabling any blocking action on it. — Detection maturity for this record is stated explicitly, not assumed production-ready.
Limitations: Detection guidance is evidence-scoped to this record; does not confirm the described technique has been observed in any specific environment.
Source Reliability & Corroboration

nvd

Source Reliability: B
Information Credibility: 3 (Possibly True)
Overall Analytical Confidence: MEDIUM

Reported by a single identified source; an independent second source has not been found (see the evidence ledger).

Intelligence Gaps
Known Unknown: Whether an independent second source corroborates this record has not been assessed.
Would be resolved by: A second, independent source reporting the same underlying fact.
Indicators / Observables
CVE: CVE-2026-80104
Indicators are defanged for safe display (e.g. hxxp:// / [.]) -- refang before use in blocking or detection tooling.

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Intelligence source: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80104 · CYBERDUDEBIVASH® SENTINEL APEX Evidence Engine v3.0
Provenance and Certification
Report IDCDB-CTI-2026-034249FC19F8
Source systemnvd
Source published2026-08-25T21:18:24.163000
Source-record SHA-256034249fc19f89989d9a8d61300036635f0cde9fbb12ea247ed9538d4515ac64a
Generated UTC2026-08-25T22:44:56.755320Z
Production ModeAI-Native Automated Intelligence — Evidence-Graph Verified
CertificationPublic Intelligence Certification: FLASH_READY (automated evidence-graph certification — see Provenance for the source basis)