CVE-2026-111106 - Mail Mint <= 1.31.4 - Authenticated (Custom+) SQL Injection...

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-111106 (CVSS 8.8) — CVE-2026-111106 - Mail Mint <= 1.31.4 - Authenticated (Custom+) SQL Injection via 'filters' Parameter. Source-attributed analysis and response guidance by CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX.

Key Judgements

Key Judgements are derived from validated ReportX claim identifiers rather than a second free-form model request. They may prioritize validation and collection, but they do not convert source-reported claims into confirmed customer impact.

Verified Facts

• Source publisher: CYBERDUDEBIVASH
• Source published: 2026-10-16T12:00:00+00:00

Threat Classification

Report family: CVE Vulnerability Advisory. Exploitation state: Unknown — source record does not confirm active exploitation. Remediation state: Availability not established in the source record — verify vendor guidance. These labels come from the normalized report context and remain bounded by cited evidence.

Threat Severity Assessment

Severity is interpreted from structured scoring or source evidence when present. No customer-specific risk score, blast radius, or compromise state is inferred by this compiler.

Evidence & Source Assessment

Primary provenance is CYBERDUDEBIVASH. The compiler distinguishes source-reported material from independently structured NVD/CISA/EPSS evidence when those fields are actually present.

Timeline & Chronology

The normalized source publication timestamp is 2026-10-16T12:00:00+00:00. Additional intrusion, exploitation, disclosure, or remediation timestamps are not asserted unless they are present in the cited evidence body below.

Business Impact

Customer-specific business impact is not established by a public source record alone. Decision value comes from determining whether relevant assets, identities, dependencies, or services are actually present and exposed.

Enterprise Exposure Assessment

• Inventory and ownership teams should determine whether the technology or service named in the cited record exists in the environment before assigning incident status.
• A positive exposure determination requires asset, version, identity, dependency, cloud/SaaS, or equivalent internal telemetry that can be tied to the cited condition.
• A negative determination should record the inventory evidence and timestamp used so the decision can be revalidated if the source record changes.

Technical Analysis

The 'filters' parameter is used by Mail Mint to construct SQL queries for filtering email lists. The vulnerability arises because the parameter is concatenated directly intoTechnical Analysis

The 'filters' parameter is used by Mail Mint to construct SQL queries for filtering email lists. The vulnerability arises because the parameter is concatenated directly into the query string without sufficient sanitization or parameterization. This allows an authenticated user with 'Custom+' privileges to inject arbitrary SQL commands. The attack vector requires valid session credentials, limiting the threat surface to internal users or compromised accounts. The impact is scoped to the application database, potentially exposing email metadata, user data, or configuration settings. Without evidence of privilege escalation, the risk remains confined to the application layer. However, if the database user has excessive permissions, the impact could extend to data modification or deletion. The lack of a public proof-of-concept means the exact injection payload structure is not established in cited evidence. Analysts should assume standard SQL injection techniques such as UNION-based or error-based extraction are possible, but this remains an inference based on the vulnerability class. The CVSS score of 8.8 reflects the high impact on confidentiality and integrity, assuming successful exploitation. The advisory does not specify whether the injection is blind or non-blind, which affects detection complexity. Organizations should review database audit logs for anomalous query patterns involving the 'filters' parameter to identify potential exploitation attempts.

For this CVE vulnerability report, the affected product is Mail Mint, with versions 1.31.4 and earlier identified as vulnerable. The root cause is the improper handling of the 'filters' parameter in SQL query construction. Prerequisites for exploitation include valid user credentials with 'Custom+' access rights. The reachable attack surface is limited to authenticated users interacting with the email filtering functionality. Exploitability evidence is not provided in the source, so no active exploitation is confirmed. The CVSS score of 8.8 is supplied in the advisory, but no CWE or EPSS data is available. Remediation involves upgrading to version 1.31.5 or later, which is presumed to fix the injection flaw. Exposure assessment requires verifying the installed version against the vulnerable range. Post-fix validation should include testing the 'filters' parameter with benign inputs to ensure normal functionality and reviewing database logs for any prior anomalous activity. Organizations should also verify that database user permissions are minimized to reduce potential impact if similar vulnerabilities exist elsewhere.

Based on the supplied evidence, the following ATT&CK techniques are applicable:

• T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application - Not applicable as the vulnerability requires authentication.
• T1078: Valid Accounts - The attacker uses valid credentials to access the application.
• T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application - Re-evaluated: The vulnerability is in a web application, but exploitation requires authentication, so this technique is less direct.
• T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter - Not established in cited evidence; SQL injection is not a command interpreter.
• T1005: Data from Local System - Not applicable; the target is a database, not local files.
• T1213: Data from Information Repositories - Potentially applicable if email data is considered an information repository.
• T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - Not established in cited evidence; no exfiltration mechanism is described.

The primary technique is the use of valid accounts to access the vulnerable application. The SQL injection itself is a method of data access or manipulation, but specific ATT&CK techniques for SQL injection are not explicitly listed in the standard matrix without further behavioral evidence. Analysts should map the exploitation to T1078 and consider T1213 if data exfiltration is confirmed. The lack of evidence for lateral movement or privilege escalation limits the scope of the ATT&CK mapping.

No specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) are provided in the source. However, the following observables can be derived from the vulnerability description:

• HTTP requests to the Mail Mint application with the 'filters' parameter

Effective detection for CVE-2026-111106 requires correlating web application logs with database audit trails, as the vulnerability manifests in the interaction between the 'filters' parameter and the underlying SQL engine. Detection logic should focus on identifying SQL injection patterns within the 'filters' query string parameter for authenticated sessions. Since the source does not provide specific payloads, detection rules must rely on generic SQL injection signatures (e.g., UNION SELECT, OR 1=1, comment sequences) combined with the specific parameter name. Analysts should configure alerts for high-frequency requests to the filtering endpoint, especially when accompanied by error responses or unusually large result sets. It is critical to distinguish between legitimate complex filtering queries and malicious injection attempts by analyzing the syntactic structure of the input. Without a known Proof-of-Concept, false positives may occur if legitimate users employ advanced filtering syntax that resembles injection patterns. Therefore, detection engineering should prioritize telemetry collection over immediate alerting until baseline behavior is established. The absence of specific IOCs means that behavioral anomaly detection is more reliable than signature-based matching alone.

• Monitor HTTP request logs for the 'filters' parameter containing SQL keywords such as SELECT, UNION, INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE.
• Correlate web server access logs with database query logs to identify sessions where the 'filters' input results in non-standard query execution.
• Alert on authenticated users accessing the filtering endpoint with inputs that trigger SQL error messages or unexpected data volume changes.
• Implement rate limiting alerts for the specific endpoint handling the 'filters' parameter to detect automated scanning or brute-force injection attempts.

Validation of detection capabilities for this vulnerability requires a controlled test environment where the vulnerable Mail Mint version is deployed. Security teams should inject benign SQL injection payloads into the 'filters' parameter to verify that logging mechanisms capture the full request context, including the user ID, timestamp, and raw input. Required telemetry includes web server access logs with query string details, application-level logs that record the constructed SQL query, and database audit logs that capture the executed statement. If the application does not log the final SQL query, detection efficacy is significantly reduced, and organizations must implement additional instrumentation. Validation should also include negative testing to ensure that normal filtering operations do not trigger false positives. The lack of a public exploit means that validation must be based on inferred attack patterns rather than observed malicious activity. Organizations should document the specific log formats and field names available in their environment to tailor detection rules accordingly. This process ensures that when an actual incident occurs, the necessary data is available for forensic analysis and rapid response.

• Verify that web server logs capture the full URI, including the 'filters' parameter, for all authenticated requests.
• Confirm that database audit logs record the user context and the exact SQL statement executed for filtering operations.
• Test detection rules with sample injection payloads to ensure they trigger alerts without generating excessive noise from legitimate traffic.
• Document any gaps in telemetry, such as missing query string logging or lack of database audit capabilities, and prioritize remediation of these gaps.

Threat hunting for CVE-2026-111106 should focus on historical data to identify potential past exploitation that may have gone undetected. Hunters should query web server logs for requests to the Mail Mint filtering endpoint where the 'filters' parameter contains suspicious SQL syntax. Specific queries should look for patterns such as 'UNION SELECT', 'OR 1=1', or comment markers like '--' or '#'. Additionally, hunters should examine database logs for queries that return an unusually large number of rows or access tables not typically queried by the filtering function. Since the vulnerability requires authentication, hunting should also include analysis of user behavior to identify accounts with anomalous access patterns, such as accessing the filtering endpoint at unusual times or from unexpected IP addresses. The goal is to identify any prior compromise that may have allowed data exfiltration or manipulation. Given the lack of specific IOCs, hunting must be broad and hypothesis-driven, focusing on the behavioral indicators of

Report-Type Deep Dive

This CVE Vulnerability Advisory record is analyzed according to the evidence available for its family. Unsupported exploit chains, malware capabilities, breach scope, attribution, encryption, exfiltration, and regulatory consequences are intentionally not synthesized.

MITRE ATT&CK Assessment

Not established in cited evidence. ATT&CK technique mapping requires source-backed behavior. Any mappings present in the preserved analytical body are subject to the existing ReportX semantic gate; the compiler adds none of its own. The factory does not infer the missing fact from absence of evidence.

Indicators & Observables

VERIFIED ARTIFACTS AVAILABLE. Indicators extracted directly from the sourced article are published below in the Indicators / Observables section (defanged for safe display).

Detection Engineering Guidance

Detection content remains evidence-conditioned. Production rules require source-backed behavior plus the telemetry needed to validate precision; otherwise the correct output is a telemetry specification rather than fabricated executable logic.

Detection Validation & Required Telemetry

• Identify the telemetry source and fields needed to observe the cited behavior before promoting detection logic.
• Replay or safely simulate only evidence-supported behavior, measure expected false positives, and retain test evidence with the rule version.
• Do not represent syntax validation as production efficacy; deployment requires environment-specific validation and accountable approval.

Threat Hunting Queries

Threat hunting should begin with exposure to the technology or service named in the cited record and then pivot only on observables or behavior established in cited evidence. Absence of a source-backed pivot is an intelligence gap, not permission to invent one.

SOC Analyst Playbook

• Validate whether the affected technology, identity, dependency, service, or victim context exists internally.
• Preserve relevant logs and timestamps before destructive containment when an internal match is found.
• Escalate from intelligence validation to incident response only when internal telemetry or independently cited evidence supports the transition.

Incident Response & Containment Decision Plan

Public threat intelligence alone does not establish an internal incident. If internal evidence confirms relevance, preserve evidence, scope affected assets and identities, contain the validated path, eradicate the supported cause, recover, and verify recurrence controls.

Remediation & Validation Plan

• Remediation state from the normalized record: Availability not established in the source record — verify vendor guidance.
• Apply vendor/CISA remediation only when that action is actually present in trusted evidence; otherwise obtain the authoritative remediation source before changing production systems.
• After change, verify asset/version state, exposure path, relevant telemetry, and rollback readiness rather than assuming the change succeeded.

Executive Decision Matrix

• No internal exposure evidence: retain as intelligence, document the negative exposure basis, and continue collection.
• Exposure confirmed but compromise unconfirmed: prioritize supported remediation and heightened telemetry while avoiding unsupported incident claims.
• Internal malicious activity confirmed: activate the organization's incident-response process using the preserved evidence and scoped telemetry.

Executive Recommendations

• Validate enterprise relevance to the technology or service named in the cited record before treating the public record as a customer-specific finding.
• Prioritize evidence-backed remediation, telemetry coverage, and verification over severity labels alone.
• Keep unresolved exploitation, attribution, breach scope, and impact statements explicitly unresolved until corroborating evidence exists.

Intelligence Gaps & Collection Requirements

• Customer-specific exposure is not established by the public source record.
• Customer-specific compromise or impact is not established unless internal telemetry is supplied.
• Any source dimension not represented in the normalized evidence graph requires additional authoritative collection before it can drive a material claim.

Analytic Confidence & Limitations

Confidence is bounded by source reliability, information credibility, corroboration state, and unresolved contradictions already computed by ReportX. Structural compilation never raises epistemic confidence.

Forecast & Outlook

No new future event is predicted by the compiler. Forecast statements, when present in the preserved analytical body, must remain tied to ReportX supporting observation claims and explicit confidence rationale.

References

• CYBERDUDEBIVASH — https://blog.cyberdudebivash.in/posts/cve-2026-111106.html